Taiwan’s security is our business

 

Most observers of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent Beijing trip fixated on her efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Just as important to our long-term security interests, however, is a strong and democratic Taiwan. American policy in Asia should work to advance that goal.

The challenge Rice faced in articulating this message to Chinese leaders is nothing new. The establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was delayed for years because of concerns about Taiwan’s vulnerability to attack. Even when President Carter finally decided to take that step in 1978, he made it clear that our “decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China” rested “upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

 

Even so, Congress wasn’t satisfied. Over the objections of the Executive Branch and loud complaints from Beijing, the Taiwan Relations Act promised that arms sales to Taiwan would continue and that the determination of which specific items to sell would be “based solely” on the needs of Taiwan.

When it turned out that in practice no one could agree on what that meant, each and every new arms sale prompted a battle in Washington followed by a dangerous, relation-threatening confrontation with Beijing. Such skirmishes continued until President Reagan decided that for our part, he would only approve sales necessary to keep the military capabilities of both sides roughly in balance. He reasoned that the total amount of sales was not nearly as important as avoiding the instability associated with Taiwan’s growing sense of vulnerability.

 

Although China found the President’s interpretation totally unacceptable, the virtually unassailable logic of the position has forced Beijing to confine itself to the “Reagan Rules” on arms sales ever since.

Not much in the strategic equation has changed since then. Taiwan, in 2008, still can’t defend itself alone and couldn’t even if the U.S. tripled its arms sales to Taipei. Indeed, such a drastic course would likely leave Taiwan no better off militarily than it is today — China can easily match any move by Taipei — and such a large volume of sales would surely risk the undoing of Taiwan’s economic miracle.

What we’ve seen instead is a substantial growth in China’s military power, without any compensatory steps taken on Taiwan’s part.

 

Some will argue that Taipei is to blame for the current imbalance. President Bush approved a generous list of weapons and upgrades for Taiwan a few years ago only to find its legislature unwilling to pay for them.

While true, don’t kid yourself — Taiwan’s inaction has consequences for us as well. Should instability or misunderstandings lead to a conflict between China and Taiwan, the consequences for the U.S. would be just as grave today as they would have been thirty years ago when we declared in the Taiwan Relations Act “that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.”

Now we are balking at Taiwan’s request to buy additional F-16 fighter aircraft, even though they make much more sense than the submarines that earlier were at the top of Taiwan’s wish list. The F-16s, Taiwan’s most modern aircraft, have been in service for almost twenty years now. Most of Taiwan’s other aircraft are even older, far less capable fighters that should have been replaced long ago.

 

And it’s not as if China has been standing still while Taiwan’s capabilities have been eroding. China’s People’s Liberation Army has been substantially expanded and modernized since 1992, when Taiwan received its first F-16s. Within flying distance of Taipei, China already has more than 400 modern fighter jets — 70 more than in the entire Taiwanese Air Force. China soon will introduce even more sophisticated aircraft to its force.

Unless Taiwan provides for the orderly replacement of its practically obsolete fighters, the existing gap in capabilities soon will dangerously widen.

True enough, selling Taiwan more F-16s will not create a balance of power. The gap is already too large for that; but more deliveries now can slow the erosion for a time.

Many in Washington right now disapprove of an upcoming March referendum in Taiwan over whether the country’s application for membership to the U.N. should be filed under its real name, Taiwan, or its politically correct name — the Republic of China. Some have called this a “provocative policy,” claiming that it amounts to a step toward independent statehood. 

 

I understand these concerns. China feels strongly that Taiwan shouldn’t call itself Taiwan and goes “ballistic” when Taipei doesn’t listen.

I also understand that China takes out its frustration on us when Taiwan resorts to administrative maneuvers of this sort. But I would hope that those who view this threat as justification for scrapping the referendum are also on board with calling for the People’s Republic to stop pointing missiles at Taiwan.

It is detrimental to America’s long-term interests to let verbal sparring between China and Taiwan take precedence over making the right decision on an arms sale.

There has always been debate within policy circles about where US interests lay vis-à-vis China and Taiwan. That is a legitimate debate.  For me, maintaining a proper relationship with China has always been a vital element of U.S. national security interests, one that we take lightly at great risk.